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ABSTRACT

The legal literature distinguishes between the liquidated damage and the penalty clauses in contracts, and
holds that penalties designed for the prevention of breach are excessive compared to the liquidated damages.
In an efficient supply chain contract, the penalty must satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints of the signatories. Considering loss-averse players, we have calculated optimal penalties in a supply
chain contract and compared those with the liquidated damages. Two possible breaches are considered – a
breach in quality of the delivery and a breach in the process. In the absence of any penalty, a process breach
reduces the supplier’s delivery risk and cost of delivery. Determining the parametric conditions for efficient
contracts, numerically we show the effects of various variables on the zone of efficient contract. We show that
the optimal penalties need not be excessive compared to the liquidated damages.
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INTRODUCTION
Contracts stipulate an agreed amount of damage upon the breach of a base obligation. If there is a
reasonable forecast of the provable injury resulting from the breach, and the compensation is decided
based on that forecast, then the enforceable compensation is known as liquidated damage. If the
compensation is excessive, then it is termed as a penalty, which has restricted enforceability under
certain legal systems. The legal literature defines liquidated damage as the sum that a promisor owes
the promisee in case of a breach by the promisor, if such a clause is present in the contract (De Geest
& Wuyts 2000; Edlin & Schwartz 2003). Historical evidence and legal verdicts indicate that the
liquidated damage clause must establish a reasonable prediction of the provable injury resulting from
the breach (Holdsworth 1924; Goetz & Scott 1977 etc.). However, the penalty clause penalizes the
promisor, and if a penalty clause is present in the contract, the non-breaching party will be limited to
the conventional damage measure, whenever the clause is enforced (Goetz & Scott 1977). Martin
(2018) describes a case wherein a buyer is in a long-term agreement with a supplier to purchase soccer
balls at $6 per ball. The buyer, located in a developed country, follows a company human rights policy
(CHRP), which all its suppliers must adhere to. The CHRP prohibits the use of child labor in production.
If it gets disclosed that the supplier, located in a developing country, is employing child labor in
manufacturing the balls, the buyer’s reputation is damaged, resulting in a loss of sales of soccer balls
and other products. If the contract includes the liquidated damages clause, the buyer should ex-ante
stipulate the amount of its expected loss caused by the lost sales and the damages to its goodwill. The
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buyer can then recover the reasonable compensation from the supplier. However, if the buyer
specifies an excessive amount (more than the reasonable amount, according to the forecast of
provable damages) in the contract, in case of a breach of the CHRP, it becomes a penalty.
This paper focuses on efficient contracting in supply chains. An efficient contract ensures that no
party has any incentive to breach the clauses included in the contract. A supply chain requires an
efficient contract to be operationally and financially efficient. In the absence of an efficient contract,
breaches that affect the operational efficiency of the supply chain occur. Breaches can result in a waste
of resources and loss of reputation. Penalty clauses are commonplace in supply-chain contracts, and
it influences the accuracy of delivery in a considerable way. In case of damage or deviation, a penalty
clause imposed by the promisee need not tally with the reasonable amount that should be charged to
the promisor. An efficient contract should include a penalty clause such that none of the parties
declines to sign it, i.e., their participation constraint is satisfied, and the promisor is incentivized not to
breach the contract after signing (Hart 1988; Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991). A comprehensive review of
supply-chain contracting under information asymmetry is available in Shen, Choi & Minner (2019).
Previous literature has utilized the penalty clause to design efficient contracts using the principalagent framework (Lutze & Özer 2008; Gan et al., 2010). However, no research compares the penalty
in an efficient contract with liquidated damage.
Supply chains should focus on cost and response-time reduction (Singh & Kumar 2020), reliable and
sustainable green practices (Gupta & Singh 2020) and socially desirable practices (Agrawal, & Singh
2020). In view of that, we have designed penalty amounts for an efficient procurement contract,
considering that the supplier may breach the contract in two respects – the quality of the delivered
product and the process of its production. The supplier may breach the contract and adopt a standard
process, instead of the process stipulated in the contract, to avoid production uncertainty and to
reduce cost. For example, consider the case of soccer ball suppliers mentioned earlier. If the suppliers
attempt to deliver the stipulated quality without employing child labor, their cost will increase because
adult labor is more expensive. According to the standard procedure, the supplier delivers a specific
quality by employing child labor. However, if the buyer gets to know that the supplier employed child
labor, then the supplier will be penalized because the buyer loses goodwill. On the other hand, if
employing of adult labor results in quality degradation, the value of the buyer erodes, and the supplier
gets subjected to a penalty due to quality degradation. We have not only identified the penalty
amounts for the two plausible breaches that are required to make the contract efficient but have also
illustrated the zones of efficient contract under different parametric conditions. We then compare the
corresponding liquidated damages to the range of penalties. We show that a penalty need not always
be excessive compared to the liquidated damage.
Excluding a couple of papers (Deng et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014), the literature on supply-chain
contracting assumes the buyers and suppliers to be risk-neutral, even though the penalty amount in
an efficient contract depends on the behavior of the supplier with respect to risk and loss. In this
paper, we have identified the penalty that makes the contract efficient when the signatories are lossaverse. Only exceptions are Zhang et al. (2014) and Deng et al. (2013). Zhang et al. (2014) developed a
model considering a risk-neutral buyer and a risk-averse supplier under cost information asymmetry.
Deng et al. (2013) studied a revenue-sharing contract under the supplier’s loss-averse behavior. But
none of these two papers studied the two plausible breaches within the scope of contract efficiency.
In view of this lacuna in the extant literature, this paper addresses the following research questions.
R1. In the presence of two plausible breaches, in quality and in process, how much penalty (for each
breach) is required to make the contract efficient if the signatories are loss-averse?
R2. Is the penalty excessive compared to the corresponding liquidated damage?
__________________________________________________
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There exists a principal-agent game at the heart of the problems that we intend to address through
the abovementioned research questions. Here, the buyer is the principal who might be affected by the
actions of the supplier, who is the agent. Hence, a principal-agent framework is most suitable for
addressing the abovementioned contract related issues discussed above. To address the first research
question, R1, we have developed a principal-agent model of the contract, considering two plausible
breaches and loss-averse players. Based on the model, we have identified the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints of the buyer and supplier. Using these constraints, we determined
the conditions on the penalty required to make the contract efficient, considering each plausible
breach. We show that the combination of penalties for each breach, required for an efficient contract,
depends on several variables and parameters. Through a numerical example, we demonstrate how
the ranges of penalty values vary with changes in the variables. This numerical example facilitated the
answer to the latter research question, R2, by enabling us to compare the penalty and the
corresponding liquidated damage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we have reviewed the relevant literature
and have developed the model in Section 3. In Section 4, we have constructed a numerical example
and identified the combinations of the penalty amounts that make the contract efficient. Moreover,
we have compared the ranges of penalty to the corresponding liquidated damage. In Section 5, we
have discussed the results, drawn managerial implications and have pointed out the scope of future
research. Finally, in Section 6, we have concluded the paper highlighting our contribution to the
literature of supply-chain contracting.

RELEVANT LITERATURE
In this section, we will review four different strands of literature. First, we will examine the legal
literature that distinguishes liquidated damages from penalty. We will then explore the literature on
delivery risks in supply-chains. In this section, we will also discuss the significant papers that discuss
the different aspects of Supply Chain Contracting (SCC). However, these papers do not incorporate
either liquidated damage or loss-aversion in their respective models. Nevertheless, the literature on
loss-aversion in supply-chain management is growing, which we will discuss at the end of this section.
THE DIFFERENCE AND CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CLAUSES OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTY
When the signatories include a liquidated damages provision in the contract, upfront they agree on a
certain computation of potential damages before a breach of the contract ever occurs. Coldwell et al.
(2016) and Reed (2018) use the example of Gator Apple, LLC v. App. Tex. Rests., Inc., to conclude that
“a liquidated damages clause in a contract is an advance settlement of the anticipated actual damages
arising from a future breach.” According to De Geest & Wuyts (2000), if the estimated compensation
is under-compensatory, the term “under-liquidated damage” is used, and if the assessed
compensation is deliberately over-compensatory, the term “penalty” is employed. The confusion
around the penalty clauses arises when distinguishing the ex-ante and ex-post valuation of losses is not
possible (Rea Jr., 1984). In American courts, generally, the reasonableness of ex-ante loss valuation is
considered while determining whether the clause in the contract is a liquidated damages clause or a
penalty clause. According to the old English law, the penalty and the liquidated damages clause are
distinguished from a perspective of intention. Penalty is applicable if the intention is to secure the
performance of the contract whereas, liquidated damages are applicable if the intention is to assess
the damages for the breach of contract (Benjamin, 1960). Chung (1992) shows that penalties can
mitigate the problem of social inefficiency caused by unreasonable liquidated damages by placing a
cap on the enforceable liquidated damages.
__________________________________________________
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SUPPLY-CHAIN CONTRACTING AND DELIVERY RISKS
Supply chain coordination and effectiveness of supply chain contracts, in presence of various risks,
have been studied extensively in the literature. Aviv (2001) shows that collaborative forecasting can
reduce uncertainty in the supply-chain. The benefits of collaborative forecasting depend on the
relative bargaining power of the supply-chain partners, the supply side agility, and the internal service
rate (Aviv, 2007). The effects of supply yield risk on supply-chain management in a single-period setting
(e.g., Yano & Lee, 1995; Gupta & Cooper, 2005; Keren, 2009; Güler & Bilgiç, 2009 and Li et al., 2012) and
multi-period settings (e.g., Tang, 2006 and Vakharia & Yenipazarli, 2009) constitute a substantial part
of the extant literature. Tang & Yin (2007) studied the role of updating supply yield information in a
dyadic supply-chain with supply uncertainty. Liu et al. (2010) studies the effects of supply uncertainty
on firm performance under joint marketing and inventory decisions in a single-period setting. Tang &
Kouvelis (2011) studies supplier diversification strategies in the presence of yield uncertainty and buyer
competition. The literature on revenue sharing contracts studies the impact of various uncertain
factors, including supplier’s lead time (Hou et al. 2009), budget constraint (Feng et al. 2015) and
presence of third-party logistics service providers (Giri & Sarker 2017).
While a breach may be the consequence of associated risk (Rangel et al., 2015), the contract should
be designed such that the agent intends to maximize the expected payoff or utility of the principal.
Negotiating a penalty clause into a contract may be a risk-reducing strategy for the buyer (Sweeney et
al., 1973; Mitchell 1995). Yao et al. (2010) and Gunasekaran et al. (2015) emphasize the delivery risk in
sourcing contacts. A contract that specifies a fixed lead-time requirement and charges a late fee for
outstanding orders is efficient (Cachon & Zhang 2006; Lutze & Özer 2008; Li et al. 2012).
Hu et al. (2013) use a principal-agent framework to study how buyers can incentivize suppliers’
investment in capacity restoration. Xu & Lu (2013) investigates the effect of supply uncertainty in pricesetting newsvendor model. Cho & Tang (2013) study advance-selling strategies in a supply-chain under
uncertain supply and demand. However, in most of these models, the principal and agent are assumed
to be loss-neutral. A scrutiny of the literature on SCC and related risk reveals that certain relevant
issues have not been addressed yet. In Table 1, we summarize the aspects of contracting that have
been covered in the extant literature, along with the features of the present study, demonstrating the
gap in the research.
LOSS-AVERSION IN SUPPLY-CHAIN
The loss-aversion research is largely based upon the prospect theory proposed by Kahneman &
Tversky (1979). Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) use it in operations and supply-chain management in
relation to the newsvendor model. The newsvendor problem under loss-aversion was studied in the
contexts of reference target (Wang & Webster 2009), equilibrium order quantity (Wang 2010; Liu et
al., 2013), multiple ordering opportunities and market information updating (Ma et al. 2012). Shen,
Pang, & Cheng (2011) study the component procurement problem for a loss-averse retailer, who is
confronted with a single-whole-sale-price contract and a spot purchase opportunity. Ma et al. (2017)
considers the manufacturer as a loss-averse newsvendor and studies its ordering decisions with supply
and demand uncertainties. Rubin et al. (2018) study the fundamental question of quality and quantity
tradeoff in the presence of loss-aversion. Channel coordination in presence of a loss-averse retailer has
been studied in Wang & Webster (2007) and Deng et al. (2013). While loss-aversion has been assumed
in the theoretical literature, there are studies that delved into empirical testing to determine whether
firms’ behavior is consistent with the assumption of loss-aversion. A comprehensive review of such
studies is available in Alexander et al. (2021).
__________________________________________________
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The theory of unconscionability of a contract prompts an examination of the influence of lossaversion in the context of liquidated damages or penalty doctrine. Marrow (2001) elaborates on the
importance of risk and loss-related behavior of different parties (i.e., buyer and supplier in a supplychain) in deciding whether liquidated damages are underestimated, overestimated or appropriate.
While agents’ risk behavior has been studied in the literature of efficient contracts, very few have
studied the loss-aversion behavior of the signatories of a contract.
Table 1. Some Major Literature Capturing Various Aspects of Contracting
Supply
Principle
Chain
Agent
Delivery
SCC /
Loss
Authors
Contract
Game
Risk
Aversion Penalty
Cachon & Lariviere (2001),
Cachon (2004), Cachon &
Lariviere (2005), Ertogral &
Wu (2001), Yao et al. (2010),
√
√
Zhao et al. (2010), Agrell et al.
(2004), Tsay & Lovejoy (1999),
Shafiq & Savino (2019)
Deng et al. (2013)

√

√

Dai et al. (2016)

√

Mathur & Shah (2008),
Frascatore & Mahmoodi
(2008), Nagarajan & Sošić
(2008), He & Zhang (2008),
Gan et al. (2010)

√

√

Giovanni (2020), Tao et al.
(2021)

√

√

Katok & Wu (2009), Wang &
Webster (2007), Dubey et al.
(2018), Eeckhoudt et al.
(2018), Vipin & Amit (2017)

√

√

√

Lee et al. (2018), Li et al.
(2021), Meza & Webb (2007)

√

√

√

√

Li et al. (2016)

√

√

√

√

Stole (1992)

√

√

The Present Study

√

√

Liquidated
Damage

√
√

√

√

√

√
√

√

√

√

The studies regarding supply-chain contracts with penalty clauses are primarily restricted to
designing efficient contracts and ensuring correct delivery. However, liquidated damage due to
incorrect process has been largely overlooked in the extant literature. There is no paper that designs
an efficient contract considering breaches in delivery as well as in process. In this paper, we fill this gap
__________________________________________________
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by determining the optimal penalties that should be announced ex-ante to make the contract efficient.
We have assumed that both the buyer and the supplier are loss-averse.

THE MODEL
We consider a general situation wherein a delivery contract is signed between a loss-averse buyer
(she) and one of her loss-averse suppliers (he). We consider loss aversion because of two reasons.
First, empirical evidence suggests that firms are loss-averse (see Alexander et al., 2021). Second, our
model specification (given later in this section) allows for loss-neutrality, depending on the value of
the coefficient of loss aversion.
After the contract is signed, the supplier can deliver a product or service as per the conditions
specified in the contract (e.g., following the buyer’s company policy, and abiding by the performance
specified variables, which may be superior to or at par with the common industry practice) or by
following a standard procedure, as per industry practices, but not adhering to the contract. In this
paper, the former is termed as ‘the correct process’ and later is called ‘the standard process’. If the
supplier attempts a correct delivery following the correct process, he must incur some extra costs in
doing so. Moreover, correct delivery following the correct process is an uncertain event. The
uncertainty is caused by the adoption of a correct process in a departure from the standard process
that the supplier is used to. The supplier receives the full payment without needing to pay any penalty
if the delivery is correct. However, according to the liquidated damages or penalty clause in the
contract, if the supplier fails to deliver the product or service correctly, he is required to pay the penalty
for incorrect delivery. On the other hand, when the supplier attempts a correct delivery following the
standard process, there is no uncertainty about the correct delivery because the process is common,
comparatively easy and the supplier is familiar to the process. However, the standard process may not
conform to the buyer’s norm(s) (e.g., ethical / environmental standard, etc., not related to the quality
of the product or service). If the supplier delivers the product or service correctly following a standard
process, he can still be penalized (for not following the correct process) in case the buyer finds out.
The rationale for imposing the penalty is that the standard process hampers the buyer’s reputation
and thus, ex post, the product value degrades. However, the supplier does not get penalized if the
buyer is unaware of the fact that the process is incorrect. After the contract is signed, the buyer does
not have control over delivery. Therefore, the contract is subject to moral hazard. Hence, while
designing the contract, the buyer must ensure that the supplier signs the contract, and after signing
it, attempts correct delivery following the correct process.
The notations used in this paper are defined in Table 2.

__________________________________________________
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Table 2. List of Notations
Notation
Definition
y
Buyer’s payment to the supplier in case of a delivery
pN

Penalty imposed by the buyer on the supplier if the supplier does not follow the correct
process and the buyer gets to know that

pQ

Penalty imposed by the buyer on the supplier in case of incorrect delivery

VH

The Buyer’s value obtained from the product / service in case of a correct delivery

VL

The Buyer’s value obtained from the product / service in case of an incorrect delivery

VL1

The Buyer’s value obtained from the product / service in case the buyer gets to know that
the correct process was not followed in production

IH

The cost incurred by the supplier if the correct process is followed

IS

The cost incurred by the supplier if the standard process is followed

ρ

The probability of a Correct delivery with the correct process

θ

The probability that the buyer does not get to know that the correct process was not
followed (and hence, perceives the delivery as ‘correct’ when the standard process is
followed by the supplier)

KB

The coefficient of loss-aversion for the buyer

KS

The coefficient of loss-aversion for the supplier

Assumption 1: VL < VH
(VH - VL) is the magnitude of the buyer’s value loss due to quality degradation.
Assumption 2: VL1 < VL< VH
Even though there is no quality degradation when the standard process is followed, the buyer’s
value erodes due to loss of goodwill, in case the market becomes aware of incorrect process.
The buyer’s value erosion, caused by the loss of goodwill, is larger than the value erosion caused
by quality degradation.
Assumption 3: IS < IH
(IH - IS) is the additional cost borne by the supplier, when the correct process is followed.
Assumption 4: 1 < KB < 1/ θ and 1 < KS < 1/(1 – ρ)
The buyer (supplier) is loss-neutral when KB = 1 (KS = 1). The upper bounds are required to ensure
that the perceived probabilities of losses remain less than 1.

__________________________________________________
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Figure 1. Game in Extensive Form
Here, the buyer is the principal, and the supplier is the agent. First, the buyer offers a contract
specifying pN, pQ and y. After observing and accepting the contract, the supplier decides whether to
follow the correct process or not. If the supplier follows the correct process, he achieves correct
delivery with a probability ρ. However, he fails to achieve correct delivery after following the correct
process, with a probability (1 – ρ), and in that case the supplier must pay the penalty for delivery
breach. If the correct process is not followed, i.e., the standard process is followed, the supplier
achieves the correct delivery with certainty. When the standard process is followed, there is a
probability (θ) of the buyer remaining unaware of the incorrect process and perceives the delivery as
‘correct’. In such a case, the supplier does not pay the penalty for process breach.
PERCEIVED PROBABILITIES OF LOSS-AVERSE PLAYERS
Since the supplier is loss-averse, he overweighs the probability of loss, that is, not achieving correct
delivery after following the correct process, by the factor of his loss-aversiveness i.e., KS. This
probability weighing function has been used in behavioral economics literature following Kahneman
& Tversky (1979). Therefore, the probability of an incorrect delivery, despite following the correct
process, as perceived by the supplier is (1–ρ)KS, and the perceived probability of a correct delivery,
after following the correct process, is (1–KS+ρKS). By Assumption 4, KS ≥ 1, i.e., the supplier overweighs
the probability of incorrect delivery following the correct process. Similarly, when the supplier follows
the standard process, the buyer’s perceived probability of remaining unaware that the supplier did not
follow the correct process is θKB and that of being aware is (1–θKB), For the supplier, the respective
perceived probabilities are (1–KS+θKS) and (1–θ)KS.
Propositions 1 and 2 outline the conditions under which the buyer’s and the supplier’s incentive
compatibility constraints, and their participation constraints are satisfied. Notably, when the buyer
(supplier) is loss-neutral, the parameter KB (KS) becomes 1. Hence, our model is general in terms of the
players’ behavioral attitude towards losses.
Proposition 1: The incentive compatibility constraints for the buyer and supplier for participating
in the correct process is satisfied when:
(𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 −𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 )+𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 (1−𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆
(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆

< 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 <

𝜌𝜌(𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 −𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 )−𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 (𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 −𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿1 )+(𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 −𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿1 )+(1−𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄
(1−𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝐵𝐵 )

Proof: For the buyer, there is an incentive to enforce the correct process instead of the standard
process if and only if,
__________________________________________________
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𝜌𝜌�𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦) + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)(𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 � > 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 (𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 )(𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿1 − 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 )
𝜌𝜌(𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 − 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 ) − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 (𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 − 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿1 ) + (𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 − 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿1 ) + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄
⟹ 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 <
(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝐵𝐵 )
Similarly, For the supplier, there is an incentive to follow the correct process instead of the
standard process if and only if,
(1 − 𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆 )(𝑦𝑦 − 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ) + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆 �𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 − 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 �
> (1 − 𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑆𝑆 )(𝑦𝑦 − 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 ) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 − 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 )
(𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 − 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 ) + 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆
< 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁
⟹
(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆
So, the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied when,
(𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 −𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 )+𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 (1−𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆
(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆

< 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 <

𝜌𝜌(𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 −𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 )−𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 (𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 −𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿1 )+(𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 −𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿1 )+(1−𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄
(1−𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝐵𝐵 )

(1)

Proposition 2: The participation constraints for the buyer and supplier for participating in the
contract that enforces the correct process is satisfied when:
(𝑦𝑦 − 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 )
0 < 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 <
(1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆
Proof: The buyer will participate in the contract if and only if,
𝜌𝜌�𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 − 𝑦𝑦) + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)(𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 � > 0
𝜌𝜌(𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 − 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 ) + (𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 − 𝑦𝑦)
⟹
< 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄
(𝜌𝜌 − 1)
𝜌𝜌(𝑉𝑉 −𝑉𝑉 )+(𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 −𝑦𝑦)
For 𝜌𝜌 < 1, 𝐻𝐻 𝐿𝐿
> 0 if and only if 𝑦𝑦 > 𝜌𝜌𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 . But since y is the price paid by
(𝜌𝜌−1)

the buyer and 𝜌𝜌𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 is the expected value that she obtains, it is impossible that the

condition 𝑦𝑦 > 𝜌𝜌𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 is true. Therefore,

𝜌𝜌(𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻 −𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 )+(𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 −𝑦𝑦)
(𝜌𝜌−1)

constraint for the buyer reduces to 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 > 0.
Similarly, the supplier will participate in the contract if and only if,
(1 − 𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆 )(𝑦𝑦 − 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ) + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆 �𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 − 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 � > 0
(𝑦𝑦 − 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 )
⟹ 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 <
(1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆
(𝑦𝑦−𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 )
So, the participation constraints are satisfied when 0 < 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 <

(1−𝜌𝜌)𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑆

NUMERICAL EXAMPLE

≤ 0. So, the participation

(2)

The contract is efficient if the supplier agrees to sign the contract, and then chooses the correct
process. Both the incentive compatibility and participation constraints are satisfied if and only if
equations (1) and (2) hold true. We have plotted the respective graphs of the two equations
considering pQ as the independent variable along the x-axis, and pN as the dependent variable along
the y-axis. The probabilities ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, KS = 1.75 and KB = 1.2, are kept constant across all graphs.
The values of each of the variables, i.e., y, VH, VL, VL1, IH and IS, are changed one at a time, keeping other
variables constant. The value of ρ is chosen as 0.5 to explain the scenario where correct delivery with
the correct process and incorrect delivery with the correct process are equally likely. The probability
that the buyer is ignorant of the fact that the supplier is using a standard process instead of the correct
one is significantly less than 0.5, as buyers generally conduct inspections. Hence, we took a
comparatively small value of θ i.e., 0.1. We chose KB = 1.2 and KS = 1.75, indicating that the buyer is less
loss-averse than the supplier. We have varied the values of VH, VL, VL1, IH and IS adhering to the
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assumptions of the model. Each graph gives us the zone of efficient contract, in the respective cases,
such that both the participation and incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. This method
allows us to study the changes in the zone according to the changes in the variables. All graphs are
shown below (Figure 2 to Figure 7). Further, in each of the six situations, we have compared the value
of the liquidated damages due to incorrect delivery, VH–VL, and that due to incorrect (standard)
process, VH–VL1, to the optimal ranges of the corresponding penalty values.
Figure 2 shows how the zone of efficient contract changes as the value of y is decreased. In
equation 1, y is not present in the expression for limiting values of pN, i.e., pN min and pN max, and these
are depicted by straight-lines BB4 and AA4 that do not change with the decreasing values of y.

A

A1

B

B1

A2

B2

A3

B3

A4
With
decreasing
values of y the
value of pQ max
is decreasing,
thus decreasing
the zone for
effective
contract
B4

Values of Constants: VH = $1500, VL = $1250, VL1 = $100, IH = $750, IS = $600,
ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, KS = 1.75 and KB = 1.2
Figure 2. Variation in pQ and pN with Decreasing y
In equation 2, the lower limit of pQ, i.e., pQ min is 0, which is represented by the straight-line AB, and
the upper limit pQ max decreases with the decreasing values of y depicted by the leftward movement
of the straight-line A4B4 from its initial position to the position of A3B3, A2B2 and A1B1 respectively.
Consequently, the zone of efficient contract decreases from area AA4B4B to area AA1B1B. So, the zone
of efficient contract decreases with a decrease in y when all other variables i.e., VH, VL, VL1, IH and IS are
unchanged. Table 3 compares the liquidated damages, VH–VL and VH–VL1, to the limiting values of the
penalties. With a reduction in base payment, y, the upper limit of penalties, pC and pN, due to breaches
in delivery and process, respectively, come down despite the unchanged value of liquidated damage.
When y falls below a threshold, the maximum applicable optimal penalties are less than the liquidated
damages. So, the optimal penalty need not be excessive vis-à-vis the liquidated damage.

__________________________________________________

279

A. Mitra and S. Sarkar

American Business Review 25(2)

Table 3. Range of Optimal pQ and pN with Variation in y
y
VH–VL
VH–VL1
pQ min pQ max
1150
250
1400
0
457.14

pN min
95.24 - 349.21

pN max
1286.36 - 1494.16

1050

250

1400

0

342.86

95.24 - 285.72

1286.36 - 1442.21

950

250

1400

0

228.57

95.24 - 222.22

1286.36 - 1390.26

850

250

1400

0

114.29

95.24 - 158.73

1286.36 - 1338.31

B1
B2
B3

A1
A2
A3

B4
With decreasing
values of VH the
value of pN max
is decreasing,
thus decreasing
the zone for
effective

A4

contract

B

A

Values of Constants: y = $1150, VL = $1250, VL1 = $100, IH = $750, IS = $600,
ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, KS = 1.75 and KB = 1.2
Figure 3. Variation in pQ and pN with Decreasing VH
Figure 3 shows the change in the zone of an efficient contract when VH decreases. In equation 1,
the value of pN max decreases with decreasing VH and this is depicted by the downward movement of
the straight-line A1B1. Consequently, the zone of optimal contract decreases when VH decreases and all
other variables i.e., y, VL, VL1, IH and IS are unchanged. The comparison of liquidated damages, VH–VL and
VH–VL1, with the limiting values of the penalties, are given in Table 4. Liquidated damages due to
delivery and process breaches increase with an increase in VH. However, in the presence of lossaversion, the upper limit of the optimal penalty for delivery breach does not change and that for
process breach increases, though not linearly. Beyond a threshold, the maximum applicable optimal
penalty becomes smaller than the liquidated damage.
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Table 4. Range of Optimal pQ and pN with Variation in VH
VH
VH–VL
VH–VL1
pQ min pQ max
1750
500
1650
0
457.14

pN min
95.24 - 349.21

pN max
1422.73 - 1630.52

1600

350

1500

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1340.91 - 1548.70

1450

200

1350

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1259.10 - 1466.88

1300

50

1200

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1177.27 - 1385.10

B1
B2
B3

A1
A2
A3

B4
With decreasing
values of VL the
value of pN max is
decreasing, thus
decreasing the
zone for effective
contract

A4

B

A

Values of Constants: y = $1150, VH = $1600, VL1 = $100, IH = $750, IS = $600,
ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, KS = 1.75 and KB = 1.2
Figure 4. Variation in pQ and pN with Decreasing VL
Figure 4 shows how the zone of efficient contract varies with a decrease in VL. By equation 1, pN
max decreases with a decrease in VL and is depicted by the downward movement of the straight-line
A1B1. Consequently, the zone of efficient contract decreases when VL decreases and all other variables
remain unchanged. The computation of liquidated damages and the upper limits of pQ and pN are given
in Table 4. In this case, the band of pN max decreases, implying that the optimal penalty need not be
excessive compared to the liquidated damages.
Table 5. Range of Optimal pQ and pN with Variation in VL
VL
VH–VL
VH–VL1
pQ min pQ max
1550
50
1500
0
457.14

pN min
95.24 - 349.21

pN max
1477.27 - 1685.10

1425

175

1500

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1420.46 - 1628.25

1300

300

1500

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1363.64 - 1571.43

1175

425

1500

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1306.82 - 1514.61
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B4
B3

A4

B2

A3

B1

A2

With decreasing
values of VL1 the
value of pN max is
increasing, thus
increasing the zone
for effective
contract

A1

B

A

Values of Constants - y = $1150, VH = $1500, VL = $1350, IH = $750, IS = $600,
ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, KS = 1.75 and KB = 1.2
Figure 5. Variation in pQ and pN with Decreasing VL1
Figure 5 shows changes in the zone of an efficient contract as VL1 decreases and all other variables
remain unchanged. Comparison of liquidated damage due to standard process, VH–VL1, and the upper
limit of pN-max is presented in Table 5. It is possible to find an optimal penalty that is less than the
liquidated damage, as the lower limit of pN is less than VH–VL1. With a reduction in the value of VL1,
liquidated damage increases. However, pN does not increase linearly due to loss-aversion.
Table 6. Range of Optimal pQ and pN with Variation in VL1
VL1
VH–VL
VH–VL1
pQ min pQ max
500
150
1000
0
457.14

pN min
95.24 - 349.21

pN max
931.82 - 1139.61

350

150

1150

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1081.82 - 1289.61

200

150

1300

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1231.82 - 1439.61

50

150

1450

0

457.14

95.24 - 349.21

1381.82 - 1589.61
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A

B

C
C1
C2
C3

D

B3

B2

B1
With decreasing values of IH the value of pQ max is
increasing and the value of pN min is decreasing ,
thus increasing the zone for effective contract

D1

D2
D3

Values of Constants - y = $1150, VH = $1500, VL = $1350, VL1 = $100, IS = $600,
ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, KS = 1.75 and KB = 1.2
Figure 6. Variation in pQ and pN with Decreasing IH
Figure 6 shows how the zone of effective contract changes with a decrease in the supplier’s cost
under the correct process, IH. By equation 2, pQ max increases with a decrease in IH, and is depicted by
the rightward movement of the straight-line BD. By equation 1, pN min decreases with a decrease in IH,
and is depicted by the downward movement of CD. Consequently, the zone of the efficient contract
increases when IH decreases, and all other variables remain unchanged.
A comparison of liquidated damages and penalties for increasing IH is shown in Table 7. VH–VL and
VH–VL1 remains constant, as the buyer’s value does not depend on the supplier’s cost. In the presence
of loss-aversion, the upper limits of pQ and pN decrease with increasing IH. Hence, the optimal penalties
become smaller than the liquidated damage after IH crosses a threshold.
Table 7. Range of Optimal pQ and pN with Variation in IH
IH
VH–VL
VH–VL1
pQ min pQ max
650
150
1400
0
571.43

pN min
31.75 - 349.21

pN max
1331.82 - 1591.56

800

150

1400

0

400.00

126.98 - 349.21

1331.82 - 1513.64

950

150

1400

0

228.57

222.22 - 349.21

1331.82 - 1435.71

1100

150

1400

0

57.14

317.46 - 349.21

1331.82 - 1357.79

Figure 7 shows changes in the zone of an efficient contract with a decrease in the supplier’s cost
under standard process, IS, when and all other variables remain unchanged. The computation of
liquidated damages and the upper limits of pQ and pN are given in Table 8.
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B
A

With decreasing
values of IS the
value of pN min
is increasing ,
thus decreasing
the zone for
effective
contract

B4
B3
B2

A4
A3
A2
A1

B1

Values of Constants - y = $1150, VH = $1500, VL = $1350, VL1 = $100, IH = $750,
ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, KS = 1.75 and KB = 1.2
Figure 7. Variation in pQ and pN with Decreasing IS
Table 8. Range of Optimal pQ and pN with Variation in IS
IS
VH–VL
VH–VL1
pQ min pQ max
250
150
1400
0
457.14

pN min
317.46 - 571.43

pN max
1331.82 - 1539.61

400

150

1400

0

457.14

222.22 - 476.19

1331.82 - 1539.61

550

150

1400

0

457.14

126.98 - 380.95

1331.82 - 1539.61

700

150

1400

0

457.14

31.75 - 285.71

1331.82 - 1539.61
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Table 9. Sensitivity of Optimal pN (variation in y) to Changes in θ and Kb
y value
pN min
1150
90.23 - 330.83
θ=0.05

θ=0.1

θ=0.15

Kb=1.1

pN max
pN min
1280.95 - 1498.64 90.23 - 330.83
90.23 - 270.68

Kb =1.2

Kb =1.3

pN max
1293.62 - 1488.15

pN min
90.23 - 330.83

pN max
1306.42 - 1477.54

1293.62 - 1439.52

90.23 - 270.68

1306.42 - 1434.76

1050

90.23 - 270.68

1280.95 - 1444.22

950

90.23 - 210.53

1280.95 -1389.80 90.23 - 210.53

1293.62 - 1390.88 90.23 - 210.53

1306.42 - 1391.98

850

90.23 - 150.38

1280.95 - 1335.38 90.23 - 150.38

1293.62 - 1342.25

90.23 - 150.38

1306.42 - 1349.20

1150

95.24 - 349.21

1273.60 - 1504.74 95.24 - 349.21

1286.36 - 1494.16 95.24 - 349.21

1299.43 - 1483.33

1050

95.24 - 285.72

1273.60 - 1446.95 95.24 - 285.72

1286.36 - 1442.21

95.24 - 285.72

1299.43 - 1437.36

950

95.24 - 222.22

1273.60 - 1389.17

95.24 - 222.22

1286.36 - 1390.26 95.24 - 222.22

1299.43 - 1391.38

850

95.24 - 158.73

1273.60 - 1331.38

95.24 - 158.73

1286.36 - 1338.31

1299.43 - 1345.40

1150

100.84 - 369.75 1265.27 - 1511.63

1050

100.84 - 302.52 1265.27 - 1450.04 100.84 - 302.52 1278.05 - 1445.30 100.84 - 302.52 1291.30 - 1440.37

950

100.84 - 235.29 1265.27 - 1388.45

100.84 - 235.29 1278.05 - 1389.55 100.84 - 235.29 1291.30 - 1390.68

850

100.84 - 168.07 1265.27 - 1326.86

100.84 - 168.07 1278.05 - 1333.80 100.84 - 168.07 1291.30 - 1341.00

100.84 - 369.75 1278.05 - 1501.05

95.24 - 158.73

100.84 - 369.75 1291.30 - 1490.06

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In our numerical example, we have taken specific values of the parameters θ, KB and KS. To validate the
robustness of our results, we have conducted a sensitivity analysis under varying values of the
parameters. Our analysis shows that the effect of changing the values of y, VH, VL, VL1, IH and IS, on the
directions of changes in the ranges of pQ and pN, is independent of the values of θ, KB and KS. For
example, with a reduction of y, the upper limits of pQ and pN come down resulting in a reduced zone of
efficient contract. This fundamental result holds even if the parameter values change. However, some
of boundary conditions on the penalties required for efficient contracting might change. For example,
the ranges of pN change nominally with changes in the values of θ and KB. The same has been
demonstrated in Table 9.
Similarly, as VH and VL decrease, the upper limit of pN reduces irrespective of the parameter values
taken for the analysis. Only the boundary values of pN changes nominally. Due to limitation of space,
we did not present the entire result of the sensitivity analysis.

DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The graphs in Figures 5 and 6 indicate that the zone for efficient contract increases with decreases in
the values of VL1 and IH. If the supplier’s cost of following the correct process (IH) decreases, it becomes
easier for the supplier to agree to a larger penalty imposed by the buyer and hence, a reduction in IH
increases the zone of efficient contract. VL1 is the value obtained by the buyer from the product when
she realizes that the supplier did not follow the correct process. The buyer loses value due to a loss in
goodwill. The smaller is the value of VL1, the greater is the loss. A decrease in value of VL1 increases the
liquidated damage, in case of a breach, which subsequently increases the zone of efficient contract.
In contrast, as shown in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 7, the zone of an efficient contract shrinks with a
decrease in the value of the studied variable. With a decrease in the value of contracted payment to
the supplier (y), the viable penalty that satisfies the supplier’s participation constraint decreases.
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Consequently, the zone of efficient contract shrinks. With a reduction in the buyer’s value from
receiving a correct delivery that followed the correct process (VH), the liquidated damages, i.e., (VH –
VL), in the case of incorrect delivery, and (VH – VL1), in the case of incorrect process, reduce. This also
results in the shrinkage of the zone of efficient contract. A reduction in the buyer’s value from
receiving an incorrect delivery (VL), ceteris paribus, increases the liquidated damage (VH – VL), keeping
(VH – VL1) unchanged. As a result, it becomes more difficult to incentivize the supplier to follow the
correct process. Consequently, the zone of efficient contract shrinks. Similarly, a decrease in the
supplier’s cost from following a standard process (IS) makes it more difficult to incentivize the supplier
to follow the correct process, thereby reducing the zone of efficient contract.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The SCC literature underexplores the issue of liquidated damage clause in the supply chain contracts,
with none of the existing models addressing liquidated damage related issues. On the contrary,
evidence from the industry suggests that liquidated damage clause primarily covers the following two
aspects: (i) delay in delivery and (ii) non-performance issues. In case of a delay by the supplier
(promisor), a reasonable penalty agreed upon by both the parties, at the time of contracting, is
charged by the buyer (promisee). Any required resolution is done by a mutual settlement outside the
court. In the case of non-performance i.e., deviation from the tolerance allowed in the contract,
rejection of the order and subsequent court cases are possible. There is a general perception that, in
the manufacturing sector, the buyer possesses more power than the supplier and hence, the supplier
hesitates to go to the court of law for conflict resolution. However, in practice, the buyer seldom goes
to court because they have the power as well as high stake, and therefore, a mutual settlement outside
of the court, and/or rejection of the order, is more beneficial to them. In the case of non-performance,
the buyer may approach the court of law, but this action is common only when a) the resolution is not
possible amicably, and/or b) the recovery option is not available, and/or c) the risk and/or cost is
exceptionally high. Big development projects, like plant or boiler commissioning projects, may be cited
as the examples of such situations. For instance, in a gas-commission plant, there are several output
specifications which the supplier may require from its buyer, and accordingly, the contract may be
signed. Now, it may so happen that because the buyer misses certain specification(s) in the input
drawing and/or checklist, the supplier delivers a plant which deviates from the requirement of the
buyer. In this case, if the delivery is subjected to rejection by the buyer, because recovery option is no
more viable (as the plant has already been set up), the supplier goes to the court of law if an amicable
resolution is not possible. To avoid this ex-post situation, it is necessary to design efficient and
equitable contracts. The present study, therefore, attempts to explore this paradigm.
Determination of the zone of efficient contract, under a given parametric condition, provides the
signatories of the contract with a set of acceptable penalties (pQ, pN) that induces the supplier to follow
the correct process. This helps the buyer and the supplier in signing an ex-ante contract with suitable
penalty clauses and aids the court of law in determining whether the penalty included in the contract
is reasonable, in the case of a dispute. The following insights are obtained directly from our numerical
analysis:
• If the base payment is small, the supplier will not sign the contract unless the penalties
charged upon a breach, are less than the corresponding liquidated damages.
• If the buyer's value of the product that follows correct delivery and process is sufficiently
high, a loss-averse supplier will not sign the contract unless the penalties are less than the
corresponding liquidated damages.
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• If the buyer's value of the product following a standard process (i.e., not following the
correct process) is sufficiently low, then a loss-averse supplier will not sign the contract
unless the penalty due to process breach is less than the liquidated damage.
• If the supplier's cost of following the correct process is sufficiently high, then they will not
sign the contract unless the penalties for delivery and process breaches are less than the
corresponding liquidated damages.
From our numerical examples, it is evident that the optimal penalties should not exceed the
liquidated damages. At the same time, the buyer must include a sufficiently large penalty if their value
erosion resulting from a breach in the process is very large. The suppliers also can determine whether
a penalty included in a contract is reasonable; and thus, our results can help suppliers decide whether
to sign a contract with a penalty clause or not. Supply-chain managers and practitioners in the field of
operations and supply-chain management, may use these insights in preparing their professionals for
signing ex-ante contracts with penalty clauses.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
This study contributes to the literature on supply chain contracting in two different ways. First, we
have considered multiple plausible breaches and compared the optimal penalties to liquidated
damages. Second, we have considered loss-averse players. There exists a plethora of game theoretical
models on supply chain contracting that use the principal agent framework, which has been reviewed
in Section 2. Among these papers, delivery risk has been considered in modeling by Giovanni (2020)
and Tao et al. (2021). However, they did not address the problems associated with loss-averse players.
On the other hand, Katok and Wu (2009), Wang and Webster (2007), Dubey et al. (2018), and
Eeckhoudt et al. (2018) considered loss aversion, but did not address the problem of delivery risk. Li et
al. (2016) is the only study to address the problem of delivery risk in the presence of loss-averse players.
However, their model does not address the problem of process breach along with delivery risk, neither
does it compare optimal penalty to associated liquidated damage. Our study filled this research gap
by designing an efficient contract, addressing both kinds of plausible breaches in the presence of lossaverse players.
Applied research on modern supply chains underscores the importance of meeting multiple
bottom lines (Agrawal & Singh 2020), which are often achieved through communication and mutual
trust (Behl et al. 2020; Gupta, Singh & Mangla 2021). Our research shows that this objective can be
achieved through an efficient contract.
SCOPE OF FUTURE RESEARCH
As a risk mitigation strategy, almost all contracts signed between the buyer and the supplier include a
remedial clause for delay and non-performance. For example, non-performance in terms of the
specifications leads to rejection of the order. Similarly, the indemnity clause is used to safeguard
against future failure, and the risk and cost clause is used to address the issues of incompletion or
delay in project delivery. These clauses either include a penalty imposed by the buyer, or rejection of
the order. Although our model considers the penalties involved in such cases, it does not explicitly
discuss the strategies used by supply chain managers to mitigate the supply risk because it is not within
the scope of the present study. Future research may study the connection between the liquidated
damage and remedial clauses.
In this paper, we have assumed that if the supplier follows a standard process, which is prevalent
in the same or similar industry, there is no risk of incorrect delivery. However, it is possible to increase
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the complexity of the model by accounting for such risks. An emerging area of research in behavioral
operations management is the study of supply chains with members having fairness concerns.
However, few papers have studied how fairness concerns of signatories may impact a contract. There
is significant scope in examining how the zone of efficient contract is affected by the fairness concerns
of the buyer, the supplier, or both.
It is also important to experimentally examine the results obtained in this paper. There exists little
empirical research on the role of loss-aversion in supply chain contracting. In this paper, we have
theoretically and numerically shown that the penalty required for an efficient contract does not need
to be greater than the liquidated damage. Our work highlights the need for experimental
investigations into loss-averse behavior in the context of supply chain contracting. Moreover, the
sociological and behavioral factors underlying loss-aversion by supply chain partners should also be
studied in related research.

CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a theoretical model of supply chain contracting by considering two
kinds of delivery risks, resulting from two different types of plausible breaches – a breach in the quality,
and a breach in the process followed. The buyer and the supplier are loss-averse and are mutually
aware of these two types of plausible breaches. An efficient contract requires different penalties for
the different types of breaches. Our model identifies the limits on these penalties, such that the
participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the buyer and the supplier are satisfied.
Consequently, there exists a zone of values, which we referred to as the zone of efficient contract,
that enables the penalties to ensure that the contract is efficient. With the help of a numerical
example, we have demonstrated how this zone of efficient contract changes with changes in values
of variables and have compared the limits of the penalties to the liquidated damage due to the breach.
We show that the penalty does not need to be necessarily greater than the liquidated damage, for the
contract to be efficient. This is an important and novel contribution to the literature. Below we
highlight our contribution.
First, our paper is the first one to design an efficient contract, considering loss-aversion. As
discussed in Section 2, the delivery risk is a well-researched area. The role of a penalty and/or liquidated
damage in designing supply-chain contracts have been studied (Cachon & Zhang 2006; Lutze & Özer
2008; Mathur & Shah 2008; Gan et al., 2010). However, unlike in our model, most of these papers
assume the signatories to be loss-neutral. There is no paper in supply-chain contracting that designed
an efficient contract in the presence of loss-aversion.
Second, we have compared the optimal penalties with the corresponding liquidated damages, and
our numerical analysis shows that the optimal penalties need not be excessive compared to the
liquidated damages. This finding is contrary to the general wisdom of legal literature, which presumes
that penalties designed for the prevention of a breach are excessive compared to the liquidated
damages.
Last, but not the least, our model is an early attempt in designing an efficient contract for a buyer
who is concerned not only with the quality of the delivery but also about the process used in
production. Considering two plausible breaches, i.e., a breach in the quality of the delivery, and a
breach in the process, we have determined the combinations of penalties that satisfy the supplier’s
participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
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